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selection	of	one	of	 the	three	electoral	methods.	In	 this	paper,	I	argue	that,	because	of	 the	key	features	of	
































	 According	 to	centripetalists,	 for	example,	preferential	voting	systems	give	candidates	and	parties	an	
incentive	to	attract	broad	support	across	ethnic	lines	(Horowitz	1993: 33).	Under	these	systems,	electors	are	
expected	 to	cast	 their	second	and	third	preference	votes	for	moderate	parties,	 irrespective	of	 their	ethnic	
origin.	This	possibility	encourages	 the	politicians	and	parties	 to	moderate	 their	political	positions	and	
cooperate	with	other	ethnic	parties	in	order	to	receive	second	and	third	preference	votes	from	the	electors	
outside	their	own	ethnic	support	base	(Horowitz	2000: 640).
	 Second,	 the	preferential	voting	systems	also	motivate	 the	ethnic	parties	 to	negotiate	and	bargain	over	
competing	political	 interests,	offering	an	arena	for	 inter-ethnic	dialogues	(Reilly	2001: 167;	2006: 816).	










Tideman,	N.	(1995)	“The	Single	Transferable	Vote,”	The Journal of Economic Perspectives,	9	(1),	p.	30.
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	 Third,	ranked-ballot	systems	provide	politicians	with	incentives	to	form	multi-ethnic	centrist	coalitions	prior	










members	of	each	ethnic	group,	 (3)	 list-PR	that	helps	reflect	 the	complexity	of	ethnic	preferences	 to	 the	
distribution	of	 legislative	seats,	and	(4)	a	significant	degree	of	segmental	autonomy	for	each	ethnic	group	














cooperation	among	competing	ethnic	parties	 through	moderation,	 interethnic	 interaction,	and	coalition	
formation.	However,	the	majoritarian	nature	of	the	preferential	voting	systems,	particularly	the	AV	system,	













































each	single-member	constituency.	Thus,	 it	 is	clear	 that	 the	AV	system	is	 inappropriate	for	 this	society.	In	
addition,	since	 the	proportionality	of	 the	STV	system	is	highly	dependent	on	 the	 transferability	of	votes	
(Lijphart	2008: 195),	this	is	also	not	a	desirable	choice	for	this	society	because	cross-ethnic	vote	transfers	are	
unlikely.	This	model	case	is	exemplified	by	the	1990	election	in	Estonia,	in	which	an	STV	electoral	system	





国際公共政策研究  第16巻第 2 号170
	 On	the	other	hand,	if	we	consider	a	society	in	which	the	majority	of	people	prefer	moderate	ethnic	parties,	
we	might	be	able	to	anticipate	cross-ethnic	vote	transfers	from	the	removed	candidates	of	radical	parties	to	


























































Figure 1.1.  Frequent Intra-Ethnic Vote Transfers
Notes:	Arrows	indicate	expected	vote	transfers.	Group	A	(EA	+	MA)	=	70%,	Group	B	(EB	+	MB)	=	30%.
Figure 1.2.  Frequent Inter-Ethnic Vote Transfers
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each	group	(Fraenkel	&	Grofman	2006: 636).	In	such	a	situation,	 if	 the	AV	system	is	used,	radical	ethnic	
parties	might	gain	the	most	first	preference	votes	from	their	own	ethnic	support	base,	and	the	parliament	
would	most	 likely	be	dominated	by	a	 radical	ethnic	party,	which	 in	 turn	would	destabilize	 the	society.	


















































































Figure 2.2.  Frequent Inter-Ethnic Vote Transfers
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parties	or	 the	degree	of	ethnic	polarization	can	change	over	 time	 in the same society.	For	example,	 the	
recurrence	of	ethnic	strife	would	easily	foster	hatred	and	division	among	ethnic	communities.	Considering	
such	sensitivity	of	ethnic	cleavages	and	 the	dynamic	nature	of	ethnic	sentiments,	 it	seems	dangerous	 to	
assume	a priori that	the	degree	of	support	for	moderate	ethnic	parties	in	a	divided	society	would	be	always	
strong,	and	that	a	majority	of	electors	would	cast	their	votes	irrespective	of	their	ethnic	origins.	Therefore,	this	
paper	 implies	 that	 list-PR,	as	advocated	by	Lijphart	and	other	consociationalists,	 is	 the	most	stable	and	
durable	electoral	system	in	conflict-prone	societies.
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Figure 4.  Choice of Electoral System and Contextual Conditions
Note:	List-PR	indicates	party-list	proportional	representation	system.
国際公共政策研究  第16巻第 2 号174
Horowitz,	D.	L.	(2000)	Ethnic Groups in Conflict.	Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press.
Horowitz,	D.	L.	(2004)	“The	Alternative	Vote	and	Interethnic	Moderation:	A	Reply	to	Fraenkel	and	Grofman”,	Public 
Choice,	121	(3/4),	pp.	507-516.
Lijphart,	A.	(1977)	Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration.	New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press.
Lijphart,	A.	(2004)	“Constitutional	Design	for	Divided	Societies”,	Journal of Democracy,	15	(2),	pp.	96-109.
Lijphart,	A.	(2008)	Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice.	New	York:	
Routledge.
Przeworski,	A.	(1991)	Democracy and the market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America.	
New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press.
Reilly,	B.	and	A.	Reynolds,	 (1999)	Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies.	Washington,	D.	C.:	National	
Academy	Press.





Sisk,	T.	D.	and	A.	Reynolds,	(eds.)	(1998) Elections and conflict management in Africa.	United	States	Institute	of	Peace	
Press.
Sisk,	T.	D.	(1996)	Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts.	Washington,	D.C.:	United	States	Institute	
of	Peace	Press.	
Sunstein,	R.	C.	(2000)	“Deliberative	Trouble?	Why	Groups	Go	to	Extremes”,	The Yale Law Journal,	110	(1),	pp.	71-119.
